The Ottoman Empire and Sufism
The Ottoman Empire and Sufism
During
the seven centuries of its existence the Ottoman State developed a
strong, yet distinctive, relationship with Islam. In the service of the
state, Islam was a popular political medium that was enormously
influential and authoritative among the empire’s Muslim population. In
order to justify the use of Islam as a channel for political stability,
the empire took great efforts to preserve the religious administration,
the class of ulema (which was granted enormous authority), in order that it could serve the wellbeing and stability of the state.
At
the same time, other groups within the empire developed interpretations
of Islam that were often independent and at odds with state-sanctioned
dogma. These were the spiritual fraternities, or tarikats. In contrast to the ulema, the tarikats were
theoretically independent of the state, and on the whole they
represented diverse social and occasionally political segments of the
Ottoman population. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to consider the tarikats and the ulema as
incessantly conflicting forces, since membership in both regularly
overlapped. Most of the Sufi orders during this period of Ottoman
history were clearly orthodox in outlook, namely the Naqshibandis,
conformist Melami-Bayramis, Qadiris, Rifa’is and the very influential
Khalwatis. Like the ulema class, the power and influence of the tarikats was widespread within the Ottoman Empire. Yet tarikat association
encompassed individuals from all social, economic, and political
spheres, ranging from the lowest peasant to the palace, whereas members
of the ulema tended to be drawn from particular sections of society.
As mentioned above the majority of Ottoman tarikats were supporters of the existing order, including the ulema establishment and its official dogma that was upheld by the state. Nonetheless, there were a number of tarikats whose affiliates espoused radical interpretations of Islam, and who would often turn out to be embittered opponents of the ulema class and, by extension, the state. The central administration spent a great amount of effort to control or eradicate these groups, and at times went as far as executing their leaders. The Ottoman State, which used Sunni Islam to legitimize its power, could hardly tolerate nonconformist departures from official dogma.
In essence the difference between the so-called orthodox and heterodox tarikats lay in their doctrines. While most tarikats (even normative ones) approved of the concept of vahdet-i vucud in
one form or another, and had often visibly Shi’i propensities,
heterodox groups were generally charged with taking these two concepts
to extremes. The notion of pantheism (an immoderate reading of the
widely acknowledged notion of vahdet-i vucud) that developed in heterodox Sufi movements also merged with the notions that these groups ascribed to their şeyhs, their spiritual guides.
Before
the 13th century Sufis were seen more or less as religious teachers or
exemplary ascetics rather than divine intermediaries and wonderworkers.
But as the tarikats developed more defined hierarchical structures in the wake of the Mongol invasions, the position of the şeyh (the
spiritual master and guide) was advanced to that of a holy man, one who
exerted spiritual command as a mediator between man and God, and who
possessed Divine grace (keramet). Despite their seemingly
otherworldly concerns, the beliefs of these Sufis did on occasion have
serious political repercussions. If a certain şeyh was able to amass a considerable following of loyal followers, and if that şeyh’s followers believed that he was indeed the kutb (axis)
of the universe, then the status of the Ottoman sultan (or any other
secular ruler for that matter) would be in question. The kutb was
seen as being the real sovereign of both spiritual and material worlds
bestowed with the ability to transform social unrest into revolutionary
action.